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INTRODUCTION 
A comprehensive reliability programme is being perf ormed by the 
UKAEA and CEGB which is studying aspects such as inspection procedures, 
equipment, and data interpretation and reporting(l). The influence of 
management and organisational aspects , and psychological and 
environmental factors are also being investigated, and the importance of 
these aspects has recently been highlighted by Behravesh et al(2). The 
information produced will enable recommendations to be made on methods 
of eliminating or controlling potential errors. These recommendations 
should, when coupled with a demonstration of the capability of the 
procedures, lead to objective and auditable assurance of the overall 
reliability of the inspection. 
The need for improved reliability is demonstrated by the 
variability that occurred in the results of international round robin 
inspection exercises such as PISC II and the Defect Detection Trials 
which have been conducted over the last few years, aimed at evaluating 
the capability of ultrasonic inspection techniques to detect , locate and 
size small flaws in test assernblies simulat.ing closely some of the 
complex geometries found in PWR's and BWR's. These exercises have 
demonstrated the very good capability of ultrasonic techniques to 
inspect thick section weldments and components, and several teams have 
achieved excellent results. 
However, in some instances errors occurred that could be attributed 
to equipment design, mistakes by an operator, or difficulties in 
interpreting complex ultrasonic sizing data. The PISC II results have, 
therefore, been analysed retrospectively with the objective of 
identifying as far as possible, the factors that contribute to the 
reliability of ultrasonic inspection(3). The first part of the analysis 
was aimed at rating performances in terms of detection capability, flaw 
location accuracy and sizing accuracy, and has demonstrated the 
variability that can occur between teams. The results provide a basis 
tor a detailed i nvestigation of the factors influencing performance and 
this is now in progress . 
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Same conclusions from the reliability studies are presented and the 
need for future investigations, focused on the key factors and issues, 
is outlined. 
THE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME 
The principal objective of the reliability programme is to provide 
information which will enable an effective inspection to the performed. 
This aim incorporates both reliability aspects and cost effectiveness 
and is intended to cover the reliability of all stages of preparing for 
and carrying out an inspection. Clearly the specification of the task, 
targets, standards, techniques and equipment must be adequate to ensure 
that the inspection system has the required inspection capability. 
Hardware and software reliability need to be assured. Also the use of 
the system, which is normally specified in inspection procedures, must 
ensure that the designed capability is not downgraded during the actual 
inspection due to human error, or inadequate procedures or training. In 
the programme a methodology has been developed for analysing 
proceduralized tasks for human error in a systematic and demonstrably 
auditable manner. The method, termed SHERPA {Systematic Human Error 
Reduction and Prediction Analysis)(4), has been applied to plant 
inspection procedures in the UK. The principles of SHERPA will be 
outlined first, then the method of application and results achieved in 
the case studies will be illustrated. 
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE 
SHERPA METHODOLOGY 
Fig. 1. Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction 
Approach (SHERPA) 
The SHERPA methodology 
The SHERPA methodology(4} can be applied to any system where 
reliability depends on Human Reliability. In applying the methodology 
it is essential to produce a plan of the tasks involved and the outcome 
is greatly improved by discussion .with the operators and observation of 
the actual inspections. The analysis techniques involved are i ndicated 
schematically in Figure 1. 
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The first step is to identify the tasks necessary to achieve the 
system objective. A hierarchical task analysis (HTA) is then performed 
with the purpose of: 
(i) obtaining a systematic description of the overall structure 
of the task in a hierarchical form 
(ii) describing the actual actions to be performed and the plans 
which guide these actions 
(iii) classifying the tasks in terms of the types of the actions 
required 
(iv) obtaining information which can subsequently be used for the 
design of procedures, training and equipment in order to facilitate 
task performance. 
The HTA is constructed by interviewing managers and operators, and 
by observation of the performance of the task and is then used as the 
basis for a Human Error Analysis (HEA) in which each Operation is 
assessed for error sources. The objectives of this analysis are to: 
(a) identify possible unrecovered error modes that could occur at 
each of the task steps documented by the HTA 
(b) postulate error recovery mechanisms 
(c) identify consequences of unrecovered error modes 
(d) identify psychologi cal mechanisms underlying these error modes 
(e) develop recommendations for procedure training and equipment 
design to minimise the probability of occurrence of errors and 
maximise the likelihood of recovery. 
Using the information gathered from the hierarchal task analysis 
and the human error analysis, SHERPA is applied to develop optimised 
procedures containing strategies for eliminating or recovering from 
error, to formulate recommendations an training requirements and to 
comment an ergonomic aspects of equipment design. 
Evaluating SHERPA Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the SHERPA methodology has been evaluated in 
assessments made an specific inspections in the UK. The overall outcome 
of such assessments demonstrates either the capability of the analyst to 
apply the SHERPA methodology effectively, or the level of reliability of 
the procedures; or both. For instance, if only a few insignificant 
errors are identified this could mean that the procedures are reliable, 
as may be the case for a system that has evolved over several years, or 
that the performance of the analysis team was inadequate. If an the 
other hand, significant sources of error are identified then clearly the 
analysis has been of value. Two separate tests have been made of the 
performance of SHERPA. The first was on a planned inspection being 
performed at the UKAEA laboratories at Risley. In this the calibration 
and inspection procedures were analysed to detect sources of human error 
and to identify recovery stages. Appropriate checking mechanisms were 
recommended for human activities which were subject to unrecovered ie 
undetected, error sources. The performance of the improved procedures 
was tested wi th a new team i n calibrating the i nspection procedures. 
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The conclusion reached was that the new procedures improved reliability 
and could be applied effectively by the inspection teams. 
A second more extensive assessment of the value of the methodology 
has been made on the procedures for inspecting a component in a 1890 
MW(e) hydro-electric power plant in the CEGB(4). To enable the 
effectiveness of the analysis to be evaluated, inspection procedures for 
the plant dating from 1981 were used in a retrospective analysis in 
which the analysts were precluded from having knowledge of subsequent 
changes to procedures or any errors that had occurred. The results of 
the analysis were formally reported and then were discussed with the 
plant inspectors to establish which errors, if any, had occurred in 
practice and which were considered feasible. 
The results revealed that SHERPA had predicted 99% of the human 
errors that were known to have occurred since 1981 or were considered by 
the inspectors to be feasible. About half of the data consisted of 
errors that had actually occurred; of these, 98% were predicted. 
Many of the human errors were trivial and were recovered almost 
immediately. To assess the significance of the errors, they were graded 
according to time lost before recovery. Those causing minor lasses of 
l ess t han one hour r epresented 73% of the total. The remainder, 
i nvolvi ng the l oss of an eight hour shift or more, totalled over 40 
actual errors and a similar nurober that were considered feasible. 
Comparing the saving in working time with the expense involved in the 
analysis it is concluded that the application of SHERPA at an early 
stage would have been cost effective. From a reliability viewpoint 
SHERPA also identified a small nurober of significant errors that would 
not be r ecovered dur ing t he i nspection s t age, and t he overall 
i mpl icati ons of t hese are being investigated. 
THE PISC II RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Defect Detection 
In t he PISC I I round robin exercise, the criterion for flaw 
detection is that the def ect volume reported by a team must overlap the 
refer ence flaw volume. I n pr actice, all teams r eported some flaws close 
t o the reference flaw but not overlapping it. Therefore in the 
retrospective analysis of PISC II results(3) an assessment was included 
of the effect of mis-location errors on defect detection, in which the 
flaw size reported by a team was increased until overlap occurred (a 
l i mit of 150mm was set on t he increase). The average value of the 
Qimensional I ncrease for Qver lap (DIO) f rom all the flaws in PISC Plate 
3 was then evaluated for each team to give an i ndicat ion of the location 
and sizing accur acy. This crit e r ion gives the maximum flaw detection 
nurober for each team. The maximum flaw detection nurober is plotted in 
Figure 2 versus the average DIO (dimensional increase for overlap) for 
each team included in the groups of procedures defined as ASME 10% DAC, 
ASME 20% DAC and special procedures groups(1). Considerable scatter 
exists in the data, however, a least squares fit is shown f or each group 
of procedures. An impor tant Observation f r om Figure 2 is that all three 
l i nes have a negative gradient. Thus, although a team's detection 
performance is improved by increasing the reported flaw s i ze ( l arge 
DI O), i n many cases this does not result in a 100% det ecti on. In 
effect, this implies that poor detection i s coupled to poor location and 
sizing accuracy for f l aws detected. 
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There is a tendency for the procedure groups to rank in the order:-
Special procedures; ASME 10% DAC; ASME 20% DAC; but there is 
considerable scatter within a group, and for the better teams in each 
there is no significant difference in performance. Assuming that the 
detection procedures for any one group are similar, then the variability 
in defect detection within a group suggests a strong operator influence 
on the reliability of the initial data gathering and detection stage. 
Further analysis is proceeding by means of structured 
questionnaires to the PISC participants to determine detailed 
information on detection and sizing procedures etc, and from the replies 
received it is considered that more detailed discussions are necessary. 
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Fig. 2. Detection as a Function of Average Dio 
Defect Classification and Sizing 
Following the sizing of flaws by the PISC teams, each defect has 
been classified by the Reference Labaratory (JRC, ISPRA) as acceptable 
or rejectable, according to ASME rules. In this analysis of flaw 
classification performance(3), the parameters considered are; detection 
perf ormance on rejectable flaws (DDFR); the performance of a team in 
correctly rejecting rejectable flaws (CRF); and the incorrect rejection 
of acceptable flaws (RAF). RAF is an indication of potential 
inefficiency in terms of unnecessary repair. 
The results for CRF as a function of DDFR are show in Figure 3. 
Eight teams detected all the rejectable flaws, 5 from the special 
procedures group, 2 from 20% DAC and 1 from 10% DAC, but only three 
teams correctly rejected all the flaws ( 2 from special procedures, 
1 from 20% DAC). The performance of the other t eams is i nfluenced to a 
greater or lesser extent by undersizing. The poor performance of ASME 
50% DAC procedures is apparent in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Detection and Sizing Performance on Rejectable 
Flaws 
In Figure 4, CRF is plottedas a function of RAF. This indicates 
that the three teams achieving 100% CRF did so with "inefficiencies" of 
between 40% and 70%, that is, that oversizing led to the rejection of 
40% to 70% of the intended acceptable f laws in Plate 3. The presence of 
satellite reflectors may influence this aspect of the analysis and this 
is another area warranting further study. 
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THE FORWARD PROGRAMME 
It is planned to amplify the demonstrated effectiveness of SHERPA 
on practical inspection procedures for an operating nuclear power 
station in the CEGB. 
The UKAEA at Risley Laboratories has developed a computer-based 
system for simulating, in real-time, ultrasonic inspection(S). This 
reproduces the important features and conditions of a manual inspection 
using stored ultrasonics data and obviates the need for a wide range of 
specific test blocks. The System will enable the calibration and 
scanning procedures under controlled conditions to be recorded, replayed 
and analysed, and a quantitative evaluation to be made of coupling 
efficiency, scan-coverage, measurement accuracy and data interpretation. 
The studies will be conducted with appropriate control of environmental 
conditions, and relevant operator characteristics will be recorded. In 
additi on, the importance of operator characteristics is being 
investigated in collaboration with the Scottish School of NDT. This 
initially has taken the form of collecting relevant personnel details 
and views on certification tests, which are then related to operator 
performance. Over 100 subjects have been analysed to date. Similar 
information will become available from the PISC programme. 
The retrospective analysis of the PI SC II results will continue by 
discussion of the sources of error in detecting and sizing flaws in 
order to understand the detailed causes. In PISC III a substantial 
programme of reliability studies is planned to test and confirm the 
conclusions of the retrospective analysis. The influence of important 
environmental and psychological factors will be investigated by planned 
interact ion withi n the framewerk of the var ious Acti ons. The programme 
for Action 2 a t MPA Stuttgart is well advanced and i s planned to 
commence in the last quarter of 1988. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Variability in defect detection is s trongly influenced by operator 
error even when working to nominally similar inspection procedures. The 
i dentification of the causes of these errors enables appropriat e 
safeguards to be instituted. Improved detection reliabili ty can be 
achieved by more rigorous specification and application of both 
inspection and training procedures, using the SHERPA methodology. 
The good results in the PISC II exercise were obtained under 
l aboratory conditions, in many cases with highly qualified and 
we ll-moti vated s taff. The impl i cations of transferring the inspection 
into field conditions with different inspectors and environmental 
conditions need to be investigated in order to provide confidence i n 
i nspection reli ability .i n rout ine inspections. The PISC programme and 
the use of the computer simulator will contribute substanti ally to t hese 
studies. 
The retrospective analys is has shown t hat for some t eams the 
i nterpretation of ultrasonic s i zing data i s subject to substantial 
error. In these cases, significant flaws were det ected but grossly 
undersized l eading to the acceptance of r eject able flaws. In other 
inst ance s , good. reject ion r a t es were a chi eved due to a signifi cant 
degree o f oversizing, but thi s also results in t he reject ion of many 
acceptable f l aws . This has obvious consequences, i ncluding the expense 
of unnecessar y repairs. The resol ution and e limination of t he causes of 
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under- and over-s~z~ng by these teams will contribute to a major 
improvement in their reliability and cost effectiveness . 
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